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Abstract: We present a decision tree to systematically evaluate the potential use 
of single event sensitive devices in spacecraft systems. We present several 
concrete examples of branches on the tree. 
1. IIitroduction 
Satellite systems must be able to 
survive the hazards of space, including 
single event upset and latchup. 
However, the choice of electronic 
components may also be constrained by 
the need to perform a particular 
mission, by schedule, or by cost. Using 
radiation hardened parts is not feasible 
in many cases, so the effect of the 
radiation environment on integrated 
circuits must be assessed. 
The sensitivity of each device 
must be measured to achieve reliable 
satellite system performance. In 
general, all tests of this nature involve 
exposing an integrated circuit to a 
monoenergetic charged particle beam 
and measuring the frequency of event 
occurrence. In practice, this process can 
be implemented in a variety of ways, 
some of which are more fruitful than 
others. In any case, the data gathered in 
single event upset or latchup testing is 
used to estimate the on-orbit behavior of 
a device. 
Inevitably, some crucial 
integrated circuit exhibits undesirable 
behavior; a device may latch up, or may 
be overly sensitive to single event upset. 
This typically occurs in the only device 
in a system" which cannot be replaced. 
Therefore, some means of recovering 
from undesirable phenomena must be 
implemented. For instance, a resistor in 
series with a device which latches up 
can prevent damage to the device; in 
addition, latchup detection and 
correction circuits may be implemented 
which automatically recover from 
latchup. Similarly, system-level 
techniques can be used to compensate 
for a device which is overly sensitive to 
single event upset. A decision tree 
representing a systematic approach to 
evaluate the use of single event sensitive 
devices is given in Figure 1. 
2. Latchup and Latchup Protection 
The first decision point on the 
Single Event Effects Decision Tree 
(Figure 1) is the box containing the 
question, "Does the device latch?". 
Ideally, one does not want to fly any 
such device; but there may be 
compelling reasons for considering a 
latchup sensitive device (e.g. a gate 
array or digital signal processor). To 
perform the required mission may 
necessitate use of such a device. 
CMOS VLSI digital devices 
generally need to be screened for 
latchup using a Californium system or 
an accelerator as a heavy ion source. If 
the device does latch up, the 
experimenter needs to determine 
important parameters including the 
latchup threshold, the latchup 
asymptotic cross section, the range of 
the latched state currents (usually in 
hundreds of milliamps) and the range of 
the latched state holding currents 
(usually less than 10 milliamps). 
Hopefully, the latched state will 
have some distinctly different 
characteristics from the normal 
operating states of the device so that a 
latchup protection circuit can be 
designed, if necessary. The difference 
between the operating current and the 
latched state current is one parameter 
that can be sensed; the change in logic 
state on an output or driver pin is 
another. 
In order to return a device from a 
potentially destructive latched state to a 
normal operating state, the supply 
current to the device must be limited by 
a resistor to prevent device burnout, and 
the supply current must be reduced to a 
level below the holding current. 
Implementing such protection in 
satellite hardware creates weight, 
volume and power penalties. There 
may also be some performance impact 
on the device itself especially with 
respect to speed of operation. 
For some missions, such as a 
shuttle mission, the environment is 
benign and the mission duration is 
short. In such a case the program office 
may elect to accept the risk of the device 
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la tching and use it without any 
protection. 
An intermediate case could be 
one in which adequate latchup 
protection is not possible because of an 
inability to sense a latched state or 
monitor the device. Even if the program 
were willing to support the latchup 
protection circuit design, a redesign or 
part substitution would be necessary. 
Example: ADSP2100A 1 
A latchup protection, detection 
and removal circuit may also have to 
restart a device such as a processor to 
continue normal system operation after 
a latchup occurs. An example of such a 
circuit, designed for the Analog Devices 
ADSP2100A digital signal processor, is 
shown in Figure 2. 
A small resistance in series with 
the device power pins protects the chip 
by limiting the latchup current, and 
prevents the VCC bond wires from 
melting. When a latchup occurs, the 
current through the resistor increases 
and the voltage applied to the 
ADSP2100A drops. This drop is sensed 
by a comparator, producing a signal that 
clocks a flip flop, creating a latch detect 
signal. This signal is used to turn off the 
series transistor, which removes power 
from the device VCC pins. At the same 
time, the entire board is reset. In order 
to extinguish the parasitic SCR that 
forms the latchup, all sources of current 
that sustain the SCR must be eliminated. 
In CMOS devices, the device input pins 
are connected to the chip VCC bus 
through a diode. Therefore, input pins 
driven high could supply current to 
sustain the SCR. To prevent this, the 
latch detect signal is used to tri-state or 
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force low all signals that drive 
ADSP2100A inputs. 
The ADSP2100A processor board 
is under the control of the subsystem 
main processor. The main processor can 
set or clear the latch detect flip flop with 
software. After the latchup has been 
extinguished, the main processor clears 
the latch detect flip flop, which allows 
power to be applied to the device and 
inputs to be driven. 
. Unforeseen problems, such as a 
greater than expecte~ device current 
increase due to total dose damage in the 
ADSP2100, could cause the supply 
current to exceed the threshold of the 
latch detect circuit. In order to prevent 
continuous triggering of the latch detect 
circuit due to total dose damage, the 
function can be disabled. The latchup 
disable/ enable function is under 
software control of the subsystem main 
processor. When disabled, the latch 
current would limited by a resistor, but 
would not be automatically switched off 
in the event of a latchup. 
The latch detect signal is used to 
generate an interrupt to the subsystem 
main processor. The interrupt service 
routine reloads the RAM based 
ADSP2100A software, clears the latch 
detect flip flop after a fixed length delay, 
and then clears the ADSP2100A reset, 
allowing the ADSP2100A to resume 
operation. 
Software on the subsystem main 
processor is also used to detect latchups 
below the threshold of the latch 
detection circuit, bit flips that cause the 
ADSP2100A to malfunction and 
latchups that take place when the latch 
detect circuit is disabled. The 
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ADSP2100A is programmed to generate 
periodiC interrupts to the main 
processor. If the interrupt is not 
generated, a timer in the main processor 
times out and generates an interrupt. 
This interrupt service routine performs a 
similar procedure as the latch detect 
interrupt service routine to re-start the 
ADSP2100A. 
A reliable latchup protection 
circuit must not be sensitive to the 
radiation environment. To this end, we 
use a radiation hardened main 
processor, a CMOS/50S 1750A. In 
addition, the devices used in the latchup 
protection circuitry are not sensitive'to 
single event upset or latchup and are 
hard enough to survive in the expected 
particle environment over the mission 
lifetime. 
To verify that the latchup circuit 
functioned properly, we exposed 
samples of the commercial ADSP2100A 
to heavy ions at Brookhaven National 
Laboratory. In all, more than 60 
latchups were generated in three 
samples, with no damage to any device. 
In addition, the devices stopped 
operating several times due to single 
event upsets; the protection circuitry 
detected this state and reset the upset 
device to restore proper function. 
3. Transient Upset 
For devices which prove to be 
latchup immune and, therefore, 
candidates for flight hardware, their 
susceptibility to soft errors or transient 
single event upset (SEU) needs to be 
assessed. A fairly inclusive data base is 
updated and published in odd 
numbered years in the IEEE 
Transactions on Nuclear Science by the 
Radiation Effects group at JPL. Another 
approach is to test for SEU sensitivity 
using an accelerator at the Brookhaven 
or Berkeley facilities. 
After determining the SEU 
threshold and cross section as a function 
of particle type and energy, we try to 
categorize and assess the kinds of upsets 
that occUr with their consequent impact 
on the particular spacecraft system. If 
the transient upset causes a serious 
system malfunction such as a change of 
attitude, orientation or pointing, then a 
system or device level protection 
scheme similar to that devised to cope 
with latchup must be developed. 
In contrast, if soft errors do not 
lead to system malfunction, the designer 
need only consider if the error rate for 
the device itself is too high for that 
device to perform acceptably. If the 
device error rate in the mission 
environment is low, one may use the 
chip as is. If the rate is too high, some 
error detection and correction (EDAC) 
scheme such as a parity check may be 
employed for the chip (often a memory 
in this case). With any EDAC comes an 
overhead exhibited as a loss of memory 
cells dedicated to error checking and a 
decrease in memory speed. Such 
performance impacts mayor may not 
prove acceptable to the system design. 
Finally, it is possible that for the same 
mission a chip's upset rate might be 
acceptable for a science data system but 
not for a command or attitude control 
system. 
In testing devices for single event 
upset it is important to exercise and 
monitor flip flops or logic gates as well 
as memory registers. Even for random 
access memories (RAMs) or read only 
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memories (ROMs) the test engineer 
should consider if any peripheral logic 
or power structures could be upset in 
addition to the memory cells. 
In general, while device level 
protection devotes nodes or registers of 
the device to its own self-monitoring 
(thus decreasing device performance), 
system level protection requires 
additional hardware and/or procedures 
which· do not necessarily decrease 
device performance but add complexity 
to system operation. The designer must 
monitor the upset device with a second 
hardened, intelligent controller 
detecting faults exterior to the chip in 
question. To rely on the system-Ievel-
generated resets requires a thorough 
testing of fault detection and correction 
capability. All error states should be 
known, exercised and reset efficiently. 
Example: FIFO Memory2 
A typical 512 x 9 bit First In First 
Out Memory consists of a circular buffer 
of 512 words and control logic with a 
read and a write pointer to keep track of 
filled and empty cells. Three status flags 
can be used to monitor the state of the 
FIFO; the empty, half-full, and full 
outputs can be used to determine if the 
FIFO is empty, full, less than half full, or 
greater than half full. 
Two types of error can occur in 
these devices. The first type, data errors 
are easily detected. However, the 
registers which contain the read and 
write pointers can also upset. These 
control errors are not so easily handled. 
For instance, if the read pointer is 
advanced by an upset, all the data 
between the previous and current 
location is lost. If the write pointer is 
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upset, a block of invalid data may be 
read, or a block of valid data may be 
overwritten. The worst control error, 
however, occurs when the read pointer 
is advanced beyond the write pointer (or 
when the write pointer is set behind the 
read pointer) by an upset. In this case, 
the entire data block is lost, and the 
device must be reset before it will 
function again. Control errors make up 
about 10% of the total cross section for a 
typical device. 
Example: 93L422 Static RAM3 
As an example of using a device 
with a high upset rate without 
protection, consider the notorious 
93L422 static RAM. Fifteen of these 
devices were used in a digital filter bank 
in an environment causing a predicted 
eight upsets per device per day. The 
consequent 120 upsets a day average to 
one upset every 12 minutes. The digital 
filter bank accumulates 128 waveform 
sample amplitudes over 40 pulses in 
each burst and the burst period is 8893 
microseconds. Thus, in one second, 
each waveform sample represents the 
average of 4498 pulses. We would not 
expect the average performance to be 
affected in the event of a single upset 
during anyone pulse. 
In this case it was also of interest 
to estima te the effect of a single upset in 
determining whether a perceptible 
perturbation in the data might result. A 
simulation of an upset in the output 
memory was run. The conclusion was 
that the soft error would not produce a 
perturbation in the data for averaging 
times greater than or equal to one 
second. 
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Example: 80C86 Microprocessor4,5 
For the case of the 80C86 microprocessor 
with a predicted rate of one upset every 
five days, the designer of the command 
system decided it was intolerable to 
reload the command system several 
times a week and a replacement part 
was found. 
Example: 80186 Microprocessor4,5,6,7 
Finally, we describe the use of the 
Intel 80186 microprocessor in an 
adaptive tracker. This device was 
predicted to upset about once every 
three days for a low earth orbit mission. 
However, since the 80186 was also 
susceptible to proton induced upsets, a 
rate of one upset every five hours could 
be reached should a large solar flare 
occur. A watchdog timing scheme was 
designed to cope with upsets. 
In the adaptive tracker, SEUs are 
detected by two watchdog timers. The 
"burst rate" timer must be reset 
approximately every 8.5 milliseconds, 
and the "track rate" timer every 50 
milliseconds. In the event that either 
timer is not reset in time, a processor 
reset is generated. 
When a reset occurs, the 
microprocessor begins executing the 
system bootup routine. This bootup 
routine interrogates the command word 
to determine what type of reset has 
occurred. In the event of an error reset, 
which is the default, the initialization 
routine assumes the state of the 
processor is contained in write-
protected RAM. This state includes the 
last mode command executed, (Idle, 
Standby, Calibrate or Track), and the 
values for all of the control variables. 
On reset, the initialization software 
brings the adaptive tracker up in the idle 
mode. This portion of the recovery 
requires about 16 milliseconds. The 
bootup routine then copies the last 
mode command from write-protected 
RAM to the command word. Finally, 
the bootup routine flags the command 
processor ready to run, and turns 
control over to the table manager 
program. 
At this point, the table manager 
program will invoke the command 
processor, as it does whenever a 
command is received, and the command 
processor will execute the command 
word. In executing the command word, 
the command processor will set the 
synchronizer parameters, and then 
signal whatever task is necessary to 
transfer to the correct mode of 
operation. This processing requires 
under 2 milliseconds to complete. Thus, 
the adaptive tracker processor can 
recover from an error reset to the 
previous mode of operation in under 
20 milliseconds. 
4. Summary 
We have presented a single event 
decision tree and discussed some 
general principles of handling single 
event sensitive devices. We have given 
several examples: 
1) ADSP2100A - device latches, 
adequate protection is possible, 
performance degradation acceptable, 
use with protection; 
2) 93L422 - device does not latch 
but has high upset rate without causing 
system malfunction, use as is; 
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3) 80C86 - device does not latch 
but has high upset rate which causes 
serious system malfunction, effective 
protection not possible, redesign with 
replacement parti 
4) 80186 - device does not latch 
but has high upset rate which might 
cause serious system malfunction under 
certain environmental conditions, 
system level protection is effective, use 
with protection. 
It is sometimes possible to use 
devices which are sensitive to single 
event effects in satellite systems. 
Effective use of these devices requires 
three things: good susceptibility data, 
adequate protection mechanisms, and 
systematic evaluation of the 
appropriateness of . the protection 
scheme. With these, the risk associated 
with using unhardened integrated 
circuits in the orbital charged particle 
environment can be minimized. 
References 
1. J. D. Kinnison et al., "Radiation 
Characterization of the ADSP 2100A 
Digital Signal Processor," IEEE 
Trans. Nucl. Sci. 3..8.., 1398-1402, 
December 1991. 
2. J. D. Kinnison et al., "A Summary of 
Recent VLSI SEU and Latchup 
Testing," presented at IEEE Nuclear 
and Space Radiation Effects 
Conference, Data Workshop, New 
Orleans, 15 July 1992. 
3. J. L. MacArthur, "Bit Upsets in the 
TOPEX Altimeter Digital Filter 
Bank," APL Memorandum S2R-
84041,28 March 1984. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
4. R. H. Maurer, J. D. Kinnison and P. 
1. McKerracher, "A Summary of 
Recent VLSI SEU and Latchup 
Testing," presented at 1990 Single 
Event Effects Symposium, Los 
Angeles, 24 April 1990. 
5. J. D. Kinnison et al., "Single Event 
Survivability of Unhardened VLSI 
Devices, "Proceedings of the 1990 
Ad v anced Microelectronics 
Technology Qualification, Reliability 
and Logistics Workshop, pp 239-248, 
San Diego, 29 August 1990. 
6. C. W. Spaur, "TOPE X Radar 
Altimeter Signal Processor SEU 
Recovery," APL Memorandum S2F-
890126, 14 March 1989. 
7. R. H. Maurer et a1., "Space Radiation 
Qualifica tion of a Microprocessor 
Implemented for the Intel 80186," 
Proceedings of the 2nd Annual 
AIAA /USU Conference on Small 
Satellites, Logan, Utah, 18-21 
September 1988. 
7 
Figure 1. Single Event Effects Decision Tree 
Yes Does Device Latch? No 
v 
Is Rate Too High? No Does Device Upset? 
,( ~( 
r----L--------~~_~--JN~o~----~--------~ 
.JiQ. Adequate Protection I ~s Program Accepts Risk? 
Possible? 
Yes 
v ,~ 
~--------~----- ~------~ ~ Degrade Performance? !:!2... Use As Is 
v 
" 
Accept Performance Yes ..... Use With ,. No 
V 
Does Upset Cause 
No 
V 
Use It 
~ Degradation? Protection System Malfunction? 
No 
'( ,( 
Redesign With 
Substitute Part 
No 
No 
Is Rate Too High? Yes I---
Use As Is 
~ Performance 
Degradation? 
Accept Degraded 
Performance? 
yes .... 
--
Effective Protection 
Possible? 
v 
Redesign With 
Substitute Part 
Use With Protection 
Device Level INo 
Protection Effective? 
Yes System-Level 
Protection Effective? 
No 
Redesign With 
Substitute Part 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Lateh Detect 
r 
CMOS Inputs 
I 
} 
Vee 
Protective 
Resistor 
... 
I ADSP 1-----....... 
2100A I..--_-I-=:.::::::..:..J OUlputs Tristated or Driven 
... 
Processor 
Figure 2. Block Diagram of the latchup protection circuit for the ADSP2100A. 
